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Gang Ji  
 
Cross listing and firm value - corporate governance or mar-





Tässä työssä tutkitaan, mitä taloudellisia vaikutuksia on sillä, että kiinalaiset yritykset lis-
tautuvat pörssissä listoille, joilla on esimerkiksi keskenään erilaiset informaatiovaatimuk-
set. Jos yritys haluaa vähentää yritysjohdon ja sijoittajien välistä informaation epäsym-
metriaa, se voi listautua pörssissä sellaiselle listalle, joka vaatii suurempaa avoimuutta ja 
enemmän informaation julkistamista. Tämän seurauksena yritysten pääoman hinta laskee, 
ja yritykset voivat aiempaa paremmin hyötyä kasvumahdollisuuksista. Empiirisessä tutki-
muksessa käy selville, että kun yrityskohtaiset tekijät vakioidaan, usealle pörssilistalle 
hakeutuminen parantaa yritysten markkina-arvoa. Tämä tulos tukee listautumisen ns. cor-
porate governance -hypoteesia. On lisäksi huomattava, että kirjanpitosääntöjen parantami-
nen ei voi korvata eri pörssilistoille listautumista. 
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This study investigates the economic consequences of cross-listing on the Chinese stock 
market. We argue that by adopting a higher disclosure standard through cross- listing firms 
voluntarily commit themselves to reducing information asymmetry. As a result, cross-
listed firms are able to benefit from growth opportunities with less appropriated cash flow 
and lower cost of capital. The empirical evidence shows that cross-listed firms indeed 
command higher valuations than their non-cross-listed counterparts, after controlling for 
certain firm-specific attributes. This lends support to the corporate governance hypothesis 
of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. The study also argues that an overall upgrad-
ing of accounting standards cannot substitute for the cross-listing mechanism. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Until February 2001, China’s stock market was rigidly segmented. While domestic inves-
tors were allowed to invest in listed firms' A shares, foreign investors could invest only in 
B shares. Cross-ownership is strictly forbidden. Chinese listed firms that raise capital by 
issuing both A and B are acknowledged as cross-listed firms. Even though listing and tra-
ding of foreign B shares takes place on the local stock market as well, the activity qualifies 
as cross-listing because the objective is to overcome market segmentation. 
Cross-listed firms are required to upgrade the disclosure standard from Chinese 
GAAP to IAS. Thus, holding other institutional factors constant
1, this unique feature dif-
ferentiates cross-listed firms from their counterparts which issue only domestic A shares. 
Maintaining a dual reporting system and auditing of IAS-based disclosures generate sig-
nificant costs for cross-listed firms. The Chinese Security Regulation Council requires that 
IAS-based disclosures be audited by international auditing firms, whereas Chinese GAAP-
based disclosures are audited by locally certified accountants. 
The benefits of cross-listing are well established, both theoretically and empirically. 
The most notable benefit is explained by the market segmentation hypothesis. The hy-
pothesis stipulates that by reducing investment barriers firms are able to spread risks across 
many investors, which lowers firms’ costs of capital
2. It seems that Chinese cross-listed 
firms should be able to benefit from increased market integration by giving access (even if 
restricted) to foreign investors. However, the existence of a significant and persistent price 
discount on B shares (vs A shares) - instead of the premium predicted and documented for 
other similarly segmented stock markets - gives cause for questioning the plausibility of 
the argument
3. This price discount shows that Chinese listed firms, by issuing foreign B 
shares, obtain much less external capital than they would by issuing exclusively to domes-
tic investors. Recent studies on this price anomaly generally attribute it to the lower returns 
expected by local A share investors. Moreover, some studies have attributed the lower 
return expected by domestic investors to two factors. Firstly, capital controls strictly pro-
                                                 
1A and B shares are traded on the same domestic exchanges and so are subject to the same institutional envi-
ronment. 
2 See reviews by Karolyi and Stulz 1998 and 2001 Gang Ji  
 
 
 Cross listing and firm value - corporate governance or 
 market segmentation? An empirical study of the stock market 
 
 
  8 
hibit domestic savings from leaving the country. Secondly, investment opportunities are 
few and often limited to the inefficient banking sector. Therefore, issuing B shares to for-
eign investors on the Chinese stock market actually results in higher capital costs for listed 
firms. This dramatic switch from a proclaimed benefit to an added cost in cross-listings not 
only questions the market segmentation hypothesis, but also demonstrates the much higher 
cost of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. 
The alternative hypothesis looks at systematic differences between Chinese GAAP 
and IAS as regards accounting standards, financial rules, and possibilities for opportunistic 
applications (eg Chen, Gul and Xu 1999). The IAS is undoubtedly the higher quality ac-
counting standard. Economic theory predicts that when a firm switches to a higher disclo-
sure standard it should experience lower capital costs deriving from information asymme-
try (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, Kim and Verrecchia 1991, 1994). Moreover, by pledg-
ing to observe a higher disclosure standard, a firms sends a credible signal that it will re-
duce the agency cost of having large shareholders, since large shareholders commit them-
selves to less consumption of private benefits. The above in turn will result in lower costs 
of capital for listed firms that issue additional equities. The so-called corporate governance 
hypothesis offers a competing and compelling theory for explaining the benefits of cross-
listing, especially regarding the Chinese stock market. 
This study argues that a cross-listed firm commits to increased information disclo-
sures, which reduces both the information asymmetry component in the cost of capital and 
the consumption of private benefits. As a result, the cross-listed firm is better able to take 
advantage of growth opportunities with less expropriated cash flows. Also, reduced infor-
mation asymmetry lowers the cost of capital, which eventually leads to higher valuation. 
The empirical evidence indeed supports this prediction, as valuation premia for cross-listed 
firms appear to be positive and statistically significant after controlling for various firm-
specifics. The traditional market segmentation hypothesis, on the other hand, is flatly re-
jected, since the presence of foreign investors in Chinese listed firms has a significantly 
negative impact on firm valuation. Moreover, the finding further corroborates those of pre-
vious studies on the B share price discount. More importantly, this study is able to demon-
strate that a general upgrading of Chinese GAAP cannot substitute for cross listing, since it 
                                                                                                                                                    
3The average discount on IPO price of a B share in a sample of 40 cross-listed firms on the Shanghai stock 
exchange is 40% of the A share IPO price. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/ 2005 
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crucially lacks the voluntary commitment to a better information disclosure standard, 
which would lead to better corporate governance. 
  
Studying the Chinese stock market is useful for two reasons. First, the well docu-
mented unique B share price discount helps to distinguish between the corporate govern-
ance and market segmentation hypotheses. Although both hypotheses predict higher firm 
valuations for cross-listing, market segmentation does not assert such influence on Chinese 
listed firms, evidently due to the B share discount anomaly. In other words, if valuation 
premiums do exist for cross-listed firms in this study, the corporate governance hypothesis 
should be given the credit. Second, Ball et al (2000) suggest that the quality of disclosure 
depends more on the institutional environment than on accounting standards. A typical in-
ternational cross-listing involves a firm moving to another country and hence to a different 
institutional environment. On the Chinese stock market, however, since both domestic and 
foreign investors are subject to exactly the same institutional framework, this study is able 
to single out the economic consequences of increased disclosures without interference 
from other institutional factors. In short, Chinese cross-listings enable the elimination of 
factors that are known to affect firm value but which are not relevant to the issue pursued 
in this study. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following areas. First, it 
builds on and extends previous studies that focus on the role of large shareholders in the 
corporate governance structure on the Chinese stock market. Second, this study provides 
direct evidence on the economic consequences of increased information disclosure. Third, 
it addresses the quality of information disclosures under two dominant accounting stan-
dards in China. Last but not least, this study is able to discriminate between two compet-
ing/complementary hypotheses on why cross-listing creates value. 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises 
previous related work. Section 3 describes recent developments in cross listing and ac-
counting standards on the Chinese stock market. Section 4 develops the research hypothe-
sis. Section 5 describes the data, and Section 6 presents the empirical evidence on cross-
listing premia. Section 7 concludes. 
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2  Review of the literature 
 
Chinese cross listing involves two key elements: the issuing of B shares exclusively to fo-
reign investors and the adopting of IAS as the disclosure standard. The following survey of 
the relevant literatures will cover both subjects. 
 
 
2.1  Market segmentation and international cross listings 
 
International cross-listing circumvents many of the regulatory restrictions, costs and in-
formational problems that present barriers to cross-border equity investing (Karolyi 1998). 
When firms reside in a closed capital market with high investment barriers, the high price 
of market risk translates into high cost of capital. This provides a strong incentive for firms 
to mitigate investment barriers eg by cross-listing internationally. Empirical studies that 
assess the cost of capital in international cross-listing have generally used international as-
set pricing models with barriers to investment.
4 Overall, the research evidence indicates 
that international cross-listing results in lower cost of capital and higher market value.
5 
On emerging markets, however, ownership restrictions often represent a form of 
investment barrier with which investors must contend. Hietala (1989) examines the signifi-
cant price premia for shares allocated to foreign buyers. He finds that foreign investors re-
quire a lower rate of return than do domestic investors. Baily and Jagtiani (1994) find an 
average premium of 19% for Thailand's Alien Board of the stock exchange, which they 
suggest is correlated with the severity of foreign ownership restrictions, tradability, and 
information availability. Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) argue that price discrimination in 
the presence of differentiated (between domestic and foreign investors) demand elasticity 
explains the price premium for foreign-class shares in Switzerland. Domowitz et al (1997) 
demonstrate that the differentiated demand elasticity hypothesis explains the significant 
premium on Mexican foreign B shares. Because foreign ownership restrictions hinder the 
market integration of these emerging economies, the above studies recognise that cross-
listing, even with restrictions, can be beneficial in breaking down market segmentation. 
                                                 
4See Karolyi and Stulz (2001) for a thorough review on this subject. 
5See Karolyi (1998) for a review of the empirical evidence. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/ 2005 
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The lower degree of market segmentation leads to lower costs of capital and thus to higher 
market valuations for cross-listed firms. 
China appears to be an exceptional case (Bailey et al 1999), where prices of foreign 
B shares trade at substantial discount to domestic A shares. This anomaly has generated 
much interest among researchers. Bailey (1994) attributes the B share discount to Chinese 
citizens' lower opportunity costs of investing due to a lack of outlets for their savings. Fer-
nald and Rogers (2000) attribute a 4-percentage-point difference in expected rates of return 
for foreign vs domestic investors to China's limited investment outlets. Charkravarty et al 
(1998) develop a model that incorporates both market segmentation and information 
asymmetry, and find evidence supporting their relative pricing equation for A and B 
shares. On the other hand, Chen, Lee, and Rui (2001) argue that the price discount is pri-
marily due to the low level of liquidity in the B share market. Li and Fleisher (2001) ex-
tend the differentiated demand elasticity hypothesis and find evidence that 'neglect' reduces 
the return on B shares. Whether because of  information asymmetry, illiquid market, or dif-
ferentiated demand elasticity, the above studies on the B share discount all find higher ex-
pected returns for foreign investors. Their evidence differs from that for other emerging 




2.2  Increased information disclosure 
 
Economic theory suggests that commitment to an increased level of disclosure should re-
duce the information asymmetry component in a firm's cost of capital (Diamond and Ver-
recchia 1991, Kim and Verrecchia 1991, 1994, Baiman and Verrecchia 1996). Leuz (2000) 
examines German firms that switch from German GAAP to IAS or US GAAP and finds 
evidence supporting the prediction. In a separate paper, Leuz (2002) looks at German firms 
that make an accounting standard choice between IAS and US GAAP upon listing on the 
New Market, but does not find a significant economic difference between the two stan-
dards. 
Coffee (1999) proposes a competing hypothesis for the market segmentation hy-
pothesis, which he calls the 'corporate governance hypothesis', Coffee argues that 'cross-
listing may be a bonding mechanism by which firms incorporated in a jurisdiction with Gang Ji  
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weak protection of minority rights or poor enforcement mechanisms can voluntarily sub-
ject themselves to higher disclosure standards and stricter enforcement in order to attract 
investors who would otherwise be reluctant to invest (or who would discount such stocks 
to reflect the risk of minority expropriation)' (Coffee 2000, p. 11). Stulz (1999) stipulates 
that cross-listing increases the cash flows investors expect to receive by increasing the 
monitoring of management and large shareholders. Reese and Weisbach (2001) examine 
the hypothesis that non-US firms cross-list in the United States in order to increase the pro-
tection of minority shareholders. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) find that Tobin’s Q is 
significantly higher for firms with US cross-listings and highest for exchange listing vs 
other types of listing. Since exchange listing entails the most stringent regulatory regime to 
which cross-listed firms are subject, they believe that the empirical evidence supports the 
corporate governance hypothesis. 
 
3  B share market and Chinese accounting standards 
 
3.1  Structure of the B share market 
 
As shown in the diagram, multiple share categories exist in the Chinese stock market. B 
shares were originally designed solely for foreign investors but were later opened to 
trading by domestic individuals. The B share market, which was first introduced to foreign 
investors in 1991, offered a means for listed firms to 'attract foreign investment, and pro-
mote internationalization of the Chinese stock market' (excerpt from Chinese Securities 
Regulation Council). However, judging by the current state of the Chinese stock market, 
neither objective has been achieved. The domestic A share market remains largely segmen-
ted from the rest of the global financial market, and the B share market remains negligible 
compared with the domestic A share market. At the end of 2004, the total market value of 
the A share market was more than $400 billion, with 1,236 listed firms, while the total 
market value of the B share market was a mere $10 billion, with 110 listings. Considering 
both the rise in B share prices towards parity with A share prices since the abolishment of 
ownership segmentation
6, the performance of the B share market is indeed uninspiring. 
 
                                                 
6 At the end of 2001, the average P/E ratio for A shares was 45 and for B shares 25. The latest statistics show 
that the P/E ratio for A shares is 17 and for B shares 12 on average. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/ 2005 
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  Diagram 1 Share categories for Chinese stock market: tradability and ownership 
Ownership \ Tradability  Traded on exchanges  NOT traded on exchanges 






Foreign investors  B share
8  
 
Although the face values of foreign B shares are denominated in Chinese yuan, their tra-
ding is conducted in foreign currencies: on the Shanghai exchange in US dollars and on the 
Shenzhen exchange in Hong Kong dollars. On the other hand, B shares are identical to A 
shares as regards cash flow rights, voting rights, and dividends. Moreover, the trading rules 
for B shares are exactly the same as those for A shares. Investors in B shares are subject to 
certain ownership restrictions. For instance, an individual investor is allowed to hold a ma-
ximum 25% of a firms' outstanding B shares. The number of foreign B shares issued can-
not exceed 49% of a firm's total outstanding shares. These limits effectively eliminate the 
possibility for foreign investors to challenge the controlling shareholder in a control con-
test. 
Cross-holding of A and B shares has been strictly forbidden on the Chinese stock 
market. Thus arbitrage is extremely difficult, if not impossible. During the past two years, 
however, considerable measures have been taken by the authorities to revive the poorly 
performing A share and illiquid B share markets. Both are plagued by poor protection of 
small investors. Since 19 February 2001, domestic investors have been allowed to trade B 
shares using their foreign currency savings. On 1 December 2002, Qualified Foreign Insti-
tutional Investors (QFII) granted foreign institutions access to the domestic A share mar-
ket.
9 Measures are designed to reduce segmentation between the A and B share markets 
and speed up integration of the Chinese stock market into the global financial market.  
In contrast to the enthusiasm of domestic investors for the B share market,
10 QFII 
remains underdeveloped. This is perhaps not surprising, given foreign investors' earlier 
lack of interest in the B share market and the continuance of ownership restrictions. Al-
though ownership restrictions still represent some of the most direct barriers to investment 
facing both domestic and foreign investors, they are not at all the most decisive barriers for 
                                                 
7 Employee shares were abolished at the end of 1998. 
8 Domestic investors were allowed to own B shares as from 19 February 2001. 
9Foreign institutional investors are allowed to hold no more than 10% of total outstanding A shares. Gang Ji  
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the formation of an efficient and liquid stock market. Coffee (2002) contends that the dif-
ference in regulatory regimes explains the pattern of international cross-listing, and strong 
legal standards tend not to repel but to attract investors. This argument might well provide 
the answer for a better corporate governance structure in the Chinese stock market. 
 
 
3.2  Chinese GAAP standard and international accounting standard 
 
Chen, Gul, and Xu (1999) examine how the current Chinese accounting standard differs 
from the IAS. They find that on average the Chinese GAAP overstates reported earnings of 
cross-listed firms by 20-30% compared to earnings reported under the IAS. After restate-
ments from Chinese GAAP to IAS, 15% of cross-listed firms change from reported profit 
to reported loss. They further find that 28.5% of the total difference between the two repor-
ted earnings is attributable to accruals, which are open to management-opportunistic repor-
ting under the Chinese GAAP. On the other hand, they expect that after the latest revision 
to the Chinese GAAP, which came into force in 1998, the difference in reported earnings 
under the two accounting standards is likely to be reduced by 50%, indicating a much clo-
ser correspondence between Chinese GAAP and IAS. The International Forum of Accoun-
tancy Development (IFAD) surveys the consistency of domestic GAAP with IAS in its 
GAAP 2001 project, and finds eight areas in which specific Chinese GAAP rules are mis-
sing concerning recognition and measurement, and another six areas in which disclosure 
requirements are lacking. It appears that the Chinese GAAP will need a drastic overhaul to 




4  Hypotheses 
 
Two competing hypotheses have been advanced to explain the benefits of cross-listing. 
Although Coffee (2000) claims that the existing evidence on international cross-listing gi-
ves greater support to the corporate governance hypothesis, he recognises that some of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
10B share prices rose sharply towards parity with A shares, and domestic individuals became the largest in-
vestor group in all geographic areas. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 14/ 2005 
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results could be seen as supporting both hypotheses. For instance, the cross-listing pre-
miums documented by Doidge et at (2004) could be attributed to both increased market 
integration and improved corporate governance in cross-listed firms. 
On the Chinese stock market however, due to the much lower expected returns for 
domestic investors, firms that intend to cross-list must be aware of the opportunity costs of 
acquiring external finance by issuing B shares. Moreover, adopting IAS would expose to 
investors management-opportunistic reporting under Chinese GAAP. Therefore, the mar-
ket segmentation hypothesis is unable to explain the cross-listing premium on the Chinese 
stock market. 
Echoing Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), and Baiman and Verrecchia (1996), Leuz 
(2000) draws a distinction between a commitment and a voluntary disclosure. The paper 
states that 'a commitment is the decision by the firm about what it will disclose before it 
knows the content of the disclosure, whereas a voluntary disclosure is a decision by the 
firm after it observes the content'. Therefore, the accounting standard choice can be seen as 
representing a commitment to greater information disclosure. Although disclosure under 
IAS is meant for foreign investors, adoption of IAS by a cross-listed firm amounts to a 
credible promise that it will disclose all information, regardless of  content, to all investors, 
regardless of nationality. This commitment effectively eliminates the information asymme-
try component in the cost of capital for both foreign and domestic investors. 
La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000) opens a new 
avenue between law and finance and argues that better investor protection promotes finan-
cial market development. Their evidence shows that strong legal protection of minority 
shareholders generates higher firm valuation. Coffee (1999), Stulz (1999), and Reese and 
Weibach (2001) claim that the benefits of a US listing stem from enhanced investor protec-
tion. Large shareholders seldom relinquish their privileges voluntarily. If a firm with con-
trolling ownership structure resides in a market with poor investor protection, the expro-
priation of minority shareholders is less likely to be detected. Moreover, the cost of a legal 
penalty could be minor and the enforcement weak. However, if large shareholders are pre-
sented with growth opportunities that must be financed externally, they will be enticed by 
the cash flows. If large shareholders expect cash flows to compensate for the loss in private 
benefits due to ownership dilution, they will opt for external finance under a wealth con-
straint. Large shareholders could raise external finance either at home, knowing that do-
mestic investors will in any case discount the expropriation possibility in asset prices, or Gang Ji  
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within a regulatory regime including greater investor protection. The large shareholder 
should understanding that in either case he will have to voluntarily commit to less expro-
priation of minority shareholders in order to raise more and cheaper capital.  
For instance, firms cross-listing on the US market voluntarily raise their corporate 
governance standards, which enables them to raise more external finance, both at home 
and abroad. Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2000) find firms with US listings become less 
credit constrained. Reese and Weisbach (2001) document a significant increase in post-
listing equity offerings outside the US. When external financing is abundantly available, 
cross-listed firms can invest in more growth opportunities with lower marginal costs of 
capital. Moreover, with less private benefits appropriated from cash flows, firms can 
achieve higher valuations. 
Foreign B shares are traded on the domestic stock exchanges. Chinese cross-listing 
is thus different from many international cross-listings, which usually migrate to another 
regulatory regime. As a result, Chinese security regulations are effectively binding to both 
domestic and foreign investors. Although the increased information disclosure by Chinese 
cross-listed firms is not exactly equivalent to migration to a higher corporate governance 
standard, it can be a functional substitute for higher substantive standards of corporate 
governance (Coffee 2002). This study borrows the above proposition and argues that the 
accounting standard choice of Chinese cross-listed firms can be interpreted as the mecha-
nism for committing to a higher corporate governance standard. 
In summary, the increase in information disclosure accomplished by the choice of 
accounting standard has a twofold impact. It reduces the firm's cost of capital and simulta-
neously increases the cash flow available for investing in growth opportunities. As firm 
value is essentially the present value of firm's future growth opportunities, this study ar-
gues that 
  
H0: Chinese cross-listed firms have higher valuations due to increased information 
disclosures. 
 
We also test the alternative hypothesis of market segmentation: 
 
H1: Chinese cross-listed firms have higher valuations due to reduced market segmen-
tation. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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5  Data and methodology 
 
This study covers firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2001. Our sample 
includes 83, 86, 87, and 88 cross-listed non-financial firms for the years 1998 to 2001 res-
pectively. For the same years, the respective numbers of firms issuing only A shares were 
379, 422, 507, and 576. Firms that issue only B shares were also excluded from the study. 
The empirical analysis includes comparison of values of cross-listed firms (issuing both A 
and B shares), to values of other firms (issuing only A shares). 
 
5.1  Descriptions of variables 
 
For the empirical study, firm value is measured by Tobin's Q: 
 
1 ,
1 , 1 , 1 ,
, '
−
− − − + −
=
t i
t i t i t i
t i TA
MV BV TA
Q s Tobin  
    
where TA i, t-1 is firm i's total assets, BV i, t-1 its book value, and MV i, t-1  its market 
value. 
Data on total asset and book value of equity were collected from listed firms’ an-
nual financial statements from the previous financial period. The prices of a firm's A and B 
shares were averaged over the 15-day period at the end of the previous calendar year. 
These average prices were then multiplied by the numbers of outstanding A and B shares 
and summed to obtain each firm's total market value. 
To test whether the standard market segmentation hypothesis is able to explain the 
cross-listing premium on the Chinese stock market, this study uses the ratio of total out-
standing B to A shares as a measure of market integration for a cross-listed firm. A higher 
ratio indicates a larger presence of foreign investors in a cross-listed firm. According to the 
market segmentation hypothesis, when the risk of domestic investors facing investment 
barriers is shared by many investors, especially with those endowed with more diversified 
portfolios, the firm's cost of capital should be lower. If the above measure is positively re-
lated to Tobin's Q, this will indicate that cross-listed firms do benefit from a higher degree 
of market integration, so that the market segmentation hypothesis cannot be rejected. The Gang Ji  
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number of outstanding A and B shares is also collected from firms' annual financial state-
ments. 
The main independent variable used to test the corporate governance hypothesis is a 
dummy variable, which takes value one for a cross-listing and zero otherwise. Cross-listed 
firms could be more highly valued simply because they have better growth prospects or 
because of other firm-specific characteristics that are common to all cross-listed firms. 
Therefore, this study employs several variables to control for the valuation effects of such 
factors. Two factors are known to affect firms' decisions on cross-listing. The first is the 
need for external finance, which is addressed by the leverage ratio, and the other is firm's 
growth opportunity, which is calculated as the average of the past two years' asset growth. 
Our empirical tests also include two more control variables: the industry median 
Tobin’s Q and the natural log of the firm's equity. The industry median Tobin’s Q separat-
es 28 industries according to CSRC classifications. All variables are calculated using in-
formation obtained from firms' annual financial statements. These two variables are calcu-
lated directly from our sample. 
 
 
5.2  Methodology 
 
Two significant changes have occurred in the institutional environment of the Chinese 
stock market during the sample period. Significant revision of Chinese GAAP in 1998 
moved it much closer to IAS, and at the start of 2001 Chinese individual investors began to 
trade B shares on the two exchanges. Thus cross-section regressions were run for each 
sample year to examine how these two structural breaks affect the cross-listing premiums. 
Given the panel data structure of our sample, the panel data analysis is reported next. This 
includes the pooled regression, fixed effect, and random effects models. The diagnostic 
tests, including Lagrange multiplier and Hausman’s test were performed to determine 
which model performs best. 
In the empirical analysis we essentially tested whether cross-listed firms (identified 
by cross-listing dummy) have higher valuations than their non-cross-listed counterparts. 
However, caveats are needed in interpreting the cross-listing premium. Cross-listed firms 
could have higher valuations simply because firms with higher valuations have better cor-
porate governance standards. These firms may prefer to use cross-listing to signal their BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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higher standards. Thus the higher valuation of cross-listed firms could be due simply to 
selection bias. To tackle the data selection problem, we adopted the Heckman's two-step 
procedure for the sample year cross-section regressions. 
In the first step of the Heckman procedure, the selection process which is responsi-
ble for selection bias problems is studied via the so-called selection model. For this pur-
pose a PROBIT model is usually estimated (because its error term is normally distributed - 
an underlying assumption of the Heckman model). In this study, the selection model 
adopts the cross-listing dummy as the dependent variable and there are twelve firm-
specific independent variables. In the Heckman procedure, the residuals of the selection 
equation are used to construct a selection bias control factor (lambda), which is equal to the 
inverse of Mill's ratio. This factor is a summarising measure which reflects the effects of 
all unmeasured characteristics. In the second step of the Heckman procedure, the analysis 
is performed on the original valuation equation (our main focus of interest). In this sub-
stantial analysis we use lambda as an additional independent control for selection bias.  
Another widely adopted method of studying cross-listings is the event study method-
ology. However, the use of event study methodology is particularly problematic as regards 
the Chinese stock market, due to poor and often irregular information disclosure practices. 
Trading on insider information is rampant, and so the establishment of a correct event win-
dow is difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, the main purpose of this study is not to inves-
tigate the effects of cross-listing on share prices but rather to explain the cross-listing pre-
mium. Therefore, this study does not apply the event study methodology.  
  
6  Empirical tests 
 
6.1  Cross-listings 
 
Panel A (Table 1) reveals some interesting patterns of cross-listings. Only five firms issued 
B shares in our sample period from 1998 to 2001, while the majority of cross-listings 
occurred prior to 1998. On the other hand, initial public offerings of domestic A shares 
totalled 197 in the same period. The pattern of dramatic decline in cross-listing activity 
seems to indirectly support the prediction that the much improved Chinese GAAP standard 
adopted in 1998 alleviates the information asymmetry problem for non-cross-listed firms Gang Ji  
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and renders cross-listing a less valuable means of committing to the better information dis-
closure.  
Panel B compares the size of cross-listed firms with their counterparts. It shows that 
the average (median) size of cross-listed firms is 67% greater than that of non-cross-listed 
firms in our sample. The difference is consistent with that of Doidge et al (2004)
11, but 
considerably smaller in magnitude. Doidge et al (2004) argues that the higher corporate 
governance standard should enhance firms' ability to raise cheaper external finance more 
easily, which results in higher total assets in cross-listed firms. This explanation appears to 
be relevant also to our findings concerning the Chinese stock market. 
 
Table 1  Summary statistics of cross-listed firms 
 
Panel A  Cross-listings by year 
  Firms issue both A and B shares  Firms issue only A shares  Total 
1998 83  379  469 
1999 86  422  516 
2000 87  507  603 
2001 88  576  673 
 
Panel B  Total assets of listed firms (in CNY bn) 















T-statistics and Wilcox signed rank statistics in parentheses. 
 
6.2  Market segmentation hypothesis 
 
Table 2 summarises the B share price discount, calculated from both the current sample 
and collected from other studies. The average (median) price discount calculated on IPO 
price is 40% in our sample. This means that, by issuing B shares to foreign investors, 
cross-listed firms would raise 40% less finance than that they would have raised by issuing 
exclusively to domestic investors. Panel B gives evidence from previous studies to demon-
                                                 
11Doidge et al (2004) document that total assets of US listed firms are six to ten times larger than those of 
non-listed firms. They argue that large firms are likely to be recognized by US investors and more likely to 
have internationally traded goods, following Kang and Stulz (1997). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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strate the consistent pattern of the B share price discount on the Chinese stock market. The 
B share discount ranges from 50% to over 80% of the A share price in various time periods 
prior to 2001. This evidence is crucial for disentangling the corporate governance and 
market segmentation hypotheses. 
 
Table 2  Price discount of B share12, %  
 
Panel A  IPO price discount of B shares on Shanghai stock exchange  
Sample Mean  Median






T-statistics and Wilcox signed rank statistics in parentheses 
 
Panel B    Evidence of B share price discount in other studies, % 
Discount = (AB)/A
13 Sample  Mean  discount 
Bailey (1994)  8 firms, 1992-1993  0.50
14 
Charkravarty, Sakar, and Wu (1998)  39 firms, 1994-1996  0.59 
Fernald and Rogers (2000)  57 firms, 1993-1997  0.53 
Karolyi and Li and (2003)  75 firms, 1999-2001  0.81 
 
The market segmentation hypothesis is tested with OLS cross-sectional regressions for 
each sample year. The tested sample includes only cross-listed firms. The results in Table 3 
show that coefficients of the proxy for market integration are negative and statistically sig-
nificant in all four sample years. This means that a cross-listed firm is lower valued if it has 
a larger presence of foreign investors. The evidence thus rejects the market segmentation 
hypothesis for the Chinese stock market. As we have discussed in studies on the B share 
discount, since the expected return is apparently higher for foreign investors than for their 
domestic counterparts, the large portion of B shares in total outstanding share results in 
higher capital costs and thus low valuation. 
Among other independent variables, the firm size is found to be negatively related 
to valuation of cross-listed firms in all sample periods. The negative coefficients seem to 
echo the 'size effect' anomaly, which is obviously difficult to interpret. We have previously 
found a negative relation between firm size and block premium. We borrow the earlier ex-
planations and argue that a large shareholder base in a large listed firm helps to prevent 
                                                 
12 Calculated as (A share price – B share price) / A share price 
13 B denotes B share price; A denotes A share price. Gang Ji  
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large shareholder’s earnings management. Although the better monitoring of large share-
holders should entail higher valuation for the firm, here in this study the Tobin's Q is calcu-
lated mainly from accounting information. As discussed in connection with accounting 
standards, previous studies show that the Chinese GAAP overestimates earnings by as 
much as 30%. Therefore, without less opportunistic possibility of pumping up earnings, the 
large firm will experience lower valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
 
Table 3  Market segmentation hypothesis 
 
This test is used to confirm previous studies on the price anomaly of A and B- shares on the Chinese stock 
market. Both pooled and sample year regressions are run individually. The model is specified as: Tobin’s Qi 
= β0i + β1*MIi + β2*Assetsi + β3*Industryi + β4*Leveragei+ β5*Growthi + ε. Degree of market integration for 
cross-listed firms is proxied by total outstanding B shares divided by total outstanding A shares. Firm size is 
the logarithm of total equity. Industry median is the industry median Tobin’s Q. Leverage is the debt-to-asset 
ratio. Growth is average revenue growth over the past two consecutive years. The sample includes only 
cross-listed firms. 























































Adjusted R-square  31.40 43.60 79.90 57.80
F-value 4.40 7.035 32.82 12.76
Observation 37 39 40 43
T-statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significance at 1% level 
** indicates significance at 5% level 
* indicates significance at 10% level 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
14 Price discount is calculated from results in Bailey (1994). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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The next step in testing the market segmentation hypothesis is to perform a panel data ana-
lysis. This is the more efficient methodology for our sample data. Moreover, panel data 
analysis enables us to check for robustness of the OLS regression. The results from the pa-
nel data analysis are shown in Table 4. The diagnostic test indicates that the pooled regres-
sion model is indeed the preferred choice of the three. The coefficients of the market integ-
ration variable are negative and statistically significant in all three models. Industry median 
Tobin's Q and firm's leverage are found to be positively correlated with Tobin's Q. Growth 
prospects gets positive coefficients in all three models, but is statically significant only in 
the fixed effects model. The result corroborates with that in the earlier OLS regression. The 
empirical evidence thus overwhelmingly rejects the market segmentation hypothesis. 
 
Table 4  Panel analysis of market segmentation hypothesis 
 
This test is used to confirm previous studies on the price anomaly of A and B shares on the Chinese stock 
market. The panel analysis is run in three specifications: pooled, fixed effects, and random effects. Results 
from diagnostic Lagrange Multiplier and Hausman tests are reported in the table. 









































Adjusted R-square  54.28 55.69 81.98
F-value  29.01 3.12 15.64
LM  0
Hausman  10.05
Observation  119 119 119
T-statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significance at 1% level 
** indicates significance at 5% level 
* indicates significant a 10% level Gang Ji  
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6.3  Corporate governance hypothesis 
 
Heckman's two-step procedure is performed for each sample-year regression.  The selecti-
on equation is estimated by PROBIT, which includes twelve firm-level independent varia-
bles. Ideally, the selection equation should employ exogenous firm characteristics which 
affect listing decisions but not the valuation equation. However, since firm size, leverage 
ratio, and growth opportunity are important factors in listing decisions, we also include 
those in the selection equation. The firm size variable is found to be significant in the se-
lection equation. 
We then estimate the valuation equation, with adjustment for selection bias. The re-
sults are reported in Table 5. The coefficients of the cross-listing dummy are negative (not 
statistically significant) for 1998 and 1999 but positive (highly significant) for 2000 and 
2001. Coefficients of Heckman's Lambda are negative and statistically insignificant for all 
sample years, indicating that selection bias does not pose a serious problem in our empiri-
cal tests. 
 
Table 5 Corporate governance hypothesis 
 
The model is specified as: Tobin’s Qi = β0i + β1*MIi + β2*Assetsi + β3*Industryi + β4*Leveragei+ β5*Growthi 
+ ε. CL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a cross-listed firm. Assets are the logarithm of 
equity. Industry is the industry median Tobin’s Q. Leverage is the debt-to-asset ratio. Growth is revenue 
growth. 
1998 1999 2000 2001
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logL -100.49 -111.32 -125.25 -140.74
Pseudo R
2  21.50 18.68 14.55 11.94
Adjusted 
R
2  44.39 36.78 34.43 34.50
Observa-
tion 425 418 471 465 559 550 634 620
T-statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significance at 1% level 
** indicates significance at 5% level 
* indicates significant at 10% level 
 Gang Ji  
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Chen et al (1999) confirm that the Chinese GAAP has been significantly improved 
since 1998, to make it more like IAS. The recent upgrade in Chinese GAAP should 
certainly reduce the information asymmetry component in capital costs for all listed firms. 
Thus, one might expect that the incentives for firms to cross-list will diminish. However, 
the cross-listing premium in the results demonstrates a time pattern of increasing magni-
tudes and significance. We argue that while both cross-listings and an improved Chinese 
GAAP represent the higher information disclosure standard, the distinction between the 
two is fundamental. As we have discussed in the previous section, a voluntary commitment 
to the higher information disclosure standard by cross-listing sends a much more credible 
signal than the overall improvement in the involuntary disclosure requirement in the Chi-
nese GAAP. Thus the pattern of increasing cross-listing premia indicates that a general 
upgrading of the accounting standard cannot be viewed as a substitute for cross-listings as 
a mechanism for achieving better corporate governance. 
The coefficients for firm size and industry median exhibit the same patterns as in 
the test of market segmentation hypothesis. The coefficients of leverage ratio, however, 
exhibit an interesting time pattern. More specifically, the coefficients changed from nega-
tive to positive during the sample period. The empirical evidence on the relationship be-
tween valuation and firm's leverage is mixed at best. The time pattern seems to support the 
timing hypothesis of how capital structure is determined under information asymmetry. 
Under the timing hypothesis, managers receive information one period before the market 
and act in the interests of long-term shareholders (Lucas and McDonald 1990). A firm is-
sues equity when it is overvalued and delays issuing when it is undervalued. Chinese firms 
flocked to the stock market to ease their finance constraints. While capital was cheap and 
abundant in the earlier years, firms took advantage of this by issuing as much equity as 
possible. Thus the lower firm leverage actually represents lower capital costs for listed 
firms. More recently, the Chinese stock market has been in an extended downturn, due to 
some negative factors: inter alia, spectacular earnings management, insider manipulation of 
share prices, and outright expropriation from minority shareholders. Meanwhile, interest 
rates are low because of expansionary monetary policy in the aftermath of the Asian finan-
cial crisis. This changing environment means that higher leverage implies lower capital 
costs and hence higher valuations for listed firms in the more recent years. 
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As discussed in the methodology section, the panel data analysis was used to test 
the corporate governance hypothesis. Table 6 shows the results from the empirical analy-
sis. The random effects panel model is preferred, based on the diagnostic test results. The 
coefficients of the cross-listing dummy are again positive for all the models, and statisti-
cally significant in both the pooled and random effects models. Coefficients of other firm-
specific variables are identical to those in the earlier empirical explorations. The adjusted 
R-square for the random effects model is 78%, which indicates a satisfactory performance 
by the panel data model. 
 
Table 6 Corporate governance hypothesis 
 
The model is specified as: Tobin’s Q = β0 + β1*CL + β2*Assets + β3*Industry + β4*Leverage+ β5*Growth + 
β6*Interactive + β7*Dummy + ε. CL is a dummy variable that takes the value one for a cross-listed firm. As-
sets are the logarithm of total assets. Industry is the industry median Tobin’s Q. Leverage is the debt-to-assets 
ratio. Growth is revenue growth. 









































Adjusted R-square  35.66 48.70 78.19
F-value  159.51 3.12 106.55
LM  34.52
Hausman  3.24
Observation  1849 1849 1849
T-statistics in parentheses. 
*** indicates significance at 1% level 
** indicates significance at 5% level 
* indicates significance at 10% level 
 Gang Ji  
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The results are thus robust under different model specifications and methodologies. The 
results clearly support the corporate governance hypothesis of a cross-listing premium on 
the Chinese stock market. On the other hand, given the results on the negative relationship 
between firm value and market integration, this study rejects the market segmentation hy-
pothesis. Moreover, the magnitude of the cross-listing premium would have been larger if 
the negative impact on capital cost of issuing B shares had been discounted. 
 
7  Conclusions and discussion 
 
Studies have documented positive impacts of cross-listing on the firm’s valuation. Efforts 
have been made to formulate alternative hypotheses to explain the cross-listing premium. 
The corporate governance hypothesis concentrates on migration to a high quality regulato-
ry regime as a means of improving the corporate governance standard. Adoption of a better 
corporate governance standard reduces the information asymmetry component in the cost 
of capital, and the consumption of private benefits. Alternatively, the market segmentation 
hypothesis looks at investor diversification as a means of lowering the cost of capital to the 
firm. Since both hypotheses are able to explain the higher valuation from cross-listing, 
separating these two hypotheses proves to be difficult. 
Chinese cross-listings offer a unique opportunity to tackle the above problem. The 
presence of a B share price discount suggests that the market segmentation hypothesis 
probably contributes to the cross-listing premium. Moreover, since B shares are also traded 
on the Chinese stock market (contrary to most international cross-listings), this study is 
able to examine the cross-listing premium without needing to consider changes in the regu-
latory environment. 
With the above unique features of the Chinese stock market, this study is able to 
provide direct evidence supporting the corporate governance hypothesis of cross-listing. 
Moreover, it demonstrates the positive economic consequence of increased information 
disclosure on the Chinese stock market. This study documents significant cross-listing 
premia under different specifications and methodologies. More importantly, this study ar-
gues that an overall upgrading of the accounting standard cannot substitute for the cross-
listing mechanism. On the other hand, this study confirms that the Chinese cross-listing 
leads to a lower firm valuation and thus rejects the market segmentation hypothesis. 
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Although the ownership restriction on B shares was finally abolished in 2001 this 
study remains relevant because it explores the critical relationship between corporate gov-
ernance and firm valuation. Although efforts have been made in recent years to break 
down investment barriers on the Chinese stock market, the overall development of this 
emerging market may still rely crucially on the extent to which corporate governance is 
improved. The latter is indeed the more difficult task ahead. Gang Ji  
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